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Interview: Sandinista Popular Army (eps) Chief, General
Humberto Ortega
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department:  General
Published:  Friday, April 16, 1993
Once again, Gen. Humberto Ortega is in the news in Washington and in Managua. Anonymous
spokespersons from the Clinton administration say Ortega's removal as army chief in 1995 was
promised by the Nicaraguan government in exchange for the release of US$50 million in US aid,
disbursement of which had been suspended since May 1992 (see CAU 04/09/93). Meanwhile, in
Managua, the long-awaited bill containing new military statutes is due to be delivered to President
Violeta Chamorro in the coming days (see article this issue of CAU). In the three years since her
inauguration, President Chamorro has consistently come under pressure from right wing critics
for her reluctance to dismiss Ortega. Meanwhile, during the same period, Ortega himself has
constantly been criticized by some of his former colleagues in the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) for presiding over the changes which have occurred in the EPS. One of the elements
widely questioned by some Sandinistas is the growing incursion of the EPS into the business world.
Albeit on a scale far smaller than the military institutions in other Central American countries, the
EPS has become increasingly active economically over the past few years. In the following interview,
Gen. Ortega addresses this and a series of closely related issues. The interview was conducted by
Yazmin Ross and appeared in the April 1993 edition of Pensamiento Propio, a monthly magazine
published in Managua by the Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales
(CRIES). Q: What is the purpose of the army's incursion into the business world? A: The budget that
we get from the state only covers our basic subsistence needs. There's not enough money there to
cover all of our necessities for the coming years. That is why we are promoting business policies
aimed at obtaining resources that will allow us to maintain the current level of wages earned by our
troops and officers, and to provide minimal social security and pension benefits to our members.
Q: How aggressively will the army embrace the rules of the free market? Do you plan to become
shareholders in banks or private companies? Will the army attempt to purchase a stake in state-
owned enterprises up for privatization? A: We'll have to see what opportunities present themselves.
But we are convinced that the army without necessarily undermining our mandate of assuring
defense of national sovereignty and of maintaining domestic order must begin to play by the rules
of the free market. Q: Without restrictions? A: The military companies which we have established
are incorporated as autonomous enterprises, and they can operate just as any civilian investment
enterprise. The army per se is not acquiring shares, but rather these autonomous enterprises. They
will not enjoy any special advantages or privileges by virtue of the fact that they are linked to the
army. They will be run just like any other private company, national or foreign, which operates
in the country. Thus, they can enter into joint ventures, they can operate independently, they
could issue stock, etc. There are many ways to operate under capitalism, right? Q: Doesn't this
kind of activity run the risk of generating fear in civil society that the armed forces are becoming
too powerful as an economic actor? A: I don't think so, because our objective in all this is simply
to [generate revenue] which will complement the budget we receive from the state. Q: But isn't
it conceivable that the very dynamic of capital growth will push the army down a path where it
begins to accumulate large quotas of power? A: We're nowhere near a position where such a thing
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could even be possible. Right now, all we want is to be able to make a few bucks. Our companies
are tiny ones. We are not out to displace the main economic actors, either the traditional ones or
the new ones. I don't think such a thing would be viable even if it were what we wanted. Q: What
kind of economic activities is the army involved in currently? A: The armed forces participate in a
series of social programs, environmental programs, and activities which we carry out in support of
the central government and its ministries. For example, we assist with vaccination campaigns, we
transport medicines to remote areas, we patrol the forests... Private sector entities have contracted
the air force for things like timber extraction, elaboration of pre-feasibility studies, etc. Q: What
does the army plan to do with the US$24 million obtained through the sale of helicopters to Peru
and of military hardware sold to Ecuador? A: Most of those funds were essentially spent even
before conclusion of the transactions. Some will go to capitalize the pension fund and the Military
Social Security Institute (Instituto de Prevision Militar). New helicopters have to be purchased.
The ones we have now are old. Almost all of them have bullet holes, they are outdated, and Russia
is giving us lots of trouble in terms of getting spare parts... We want to replace the [Soviet-built]
helicopters with ones manufactured in the West, which are more versatile and more economical in
terms of fuel consumption. We're working with several European countries, with some companies
in the US and in Canada, and we will need liquid resources to make the first payments. Q: How
many helicopters are needed? A: Ten or twelve. We need some this year for troop transport, for
the fight against drug trafficking, for reconnaissance missions on our coasts and borders, and to
confront natural disasters... Q: How many foreign bank accounts does the army have? A: I don't
have that information...we've got as many as we need in order to function properly. Our army
manages less than US$6 million in foreign exchange. That amount is so small, it would be a joke for
an army anywhere else in the world. The money never sits in the bank for long, it is quickly spent
on vehicles, spare parts, materials for the military hospital, fuel, etc. In fact, for the most part what
we have are debts, rather than savings. We have a lot of expenses to cover. Q: Why do businessmen
and investors always turn to Humberto Ortega for advice? A: It's true that businessmen and foreign
investors seek me out. They want to know what the army thinks, or what I think, regarding the
security of private capital invested here, if order will be maintained so that investments won't be
threatened...if the situation here will be kept from exploding into chaos, if the confiscations [of the
1980s] will be repeated. I explain to them that even if the Sandinistas were to win [elections] again,
the types of measures that were adopted in the past could not be repeated. Private capital is safe
here, especially foreign capital. The Sandinista Front will no longer be able to affect these assets, as
long as they were not obtained illicitly and as long as they are not dormant. Q: Are you personally
involved in any investment activities outside of those of the army as an institution? A: I haven't had
any time, nor do I have the resources. In order to be a businessman, you've got to do it full time,
otherwise you'll go broke. At some point in the future, I wouldn't mind getting into business, but
for now the only business activity I am involved with is that of the institution. Through this activity,
we have been able to build up friendships; people feel secure dealing with companies linked to
the army because here they find better organization, planning, discipline, and more control over
the leadership of the companies... Q: Regarding the consultations that you have with businessmen,
doesn't that wind up getting you involved in one way or another in their investment activities? A:
Businessmen are very good listeners. They take it all in, but they are not good at giving anything
up. They won't even give out the time of day. Q: So what's the profit in all of this? A: What I get
out of this is simply the satisfaction of seeing that the country gains jobs, that we have increased
stability. I give these businessmen enthusiasm, I give them the confidence they need to invest in
Nicaragua. I give them a political interpretation regarding what's going on here. I give them some
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peace of mind. We share thoughts about the negative image of Nicaragua which exists outside the
country. Then I send them over to the central government so that there they may decide whether or
not to make investments in Nicaragua. Remember that with each investment which is made, jobs are
being created, and in this way, we are fighting poverty. I feel a sense of satisfaction in this regard...
Q: To what do you attribute the negative image which surrounds Sandinista leaders in the sense
that they have become rich? A: Well, as they say, in a country of blind people, a one-eyed man is
king! In Nicaragua, someone who lives in a house which in Mexico, for example, wouldn't even be
considered middle class, here they are singled out as a millionaire. In this country, if you've even got
a car, your considered bourgeois. There are many myths. Q: If we keep in mind that we are talking
about leaders who emerged as part of a popular revolution, it is understandable that ostentation
generates protest. A: That's something else altogether. Q: How is it something else? A: This has
nothing to do with individuals becoming separated from the commitment to struggle for what they
have always believed in. Q: Isn't there a contradiction there? A: I believe there is not. A person in a
leadership role is always exposed to attack. Thus it is only prudent that they travel with protection,
with bodyguards. It's not the same thing to assault an average person as it is to assault someone who
has responsibilities. Even in the most basic tribal hierarchy, there is a chief; in the poorest of the
poor neighborhoods, there's still a leader. And those individuals need to have a different status. If I
were to get around in the same conditions as the people whose lot I'm trying to improve, I'd never
be able to get my work done. If I took the bus, I wouldn't have any time to take care of the problems.
A separate matter is those who fall into the trap of consumerism or who go around wasting their
money on stupid things. Q: When will Humberto Ortega no longer be chief of the army? A: I think
the current one-person leadership model is necessary during this period in which we are working
on changes in the chiefs of staff, something which will be dealt with in the new military statutes. The
lack of a strong leadership figure like myself, in the absence of mechanisms which assure continuity
up through the ranks, could lead to conflicts and struggles over promotions. The standard service
term anywhere for career military personnel is 24 years; and I've only been here for 13. During this
difficult transition period I am slowly but surely ceasing to be a military man.
-- End --
